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当前的国有企业改革试图通过对国有企业实行公司制和股份制改造,既使国家仍然保持出资人身份,又使企业拥有独立的法人资格,并以盈利为目标参与市场竞争,国家只以投入资本额为限承担有限责任,从而使国有制与市场经济相兼容。但由于股权结构特殊性,即国家仍作为企业的大股东,所以并未解决国有资产的所有者缺位问题和代理问题,也即激励与约束机制不健全的问题仍然没有得到根本解决,同时企业的经营者实际上仍由作为大股东的政府机构或国有资产管理机构任命,故经营者的选择问题也没有得到解决。本文借鉴西方现代的代理理论,对如何完善国有企业的经理人员激励约束机制进行探讨。
At present, the reform of state-owned enterprises tries to reform the state-owned enterprises through shareholding system and shareholding system. Even if the state still retains the investor's status and the enterprise has independent legal person status, and participates in market competition with profit target, To assume limited liability, so that the state-owned and market economy compatible. However, due to the particularity of the ownership structure, that is, the state still acts as the major shareholder of the enterprise, the absence and agency problem of the owner of the state-owned assets are not solved. That is, the unsound incentives and restraint mechanisms are still not fundamentally solved. At the same time, Operators are still actually appointed by the government agencies or state-owned assets management agencies as the major shareholders, the problem of the choice of managers has not been solved. This article draws lessons from the western modern agent theory, to discuss how to perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism of the managers of state-owned enterprises.