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随着市场经济的日益发达及企业组织的演化,公司股东与管理者的关系越加复杂,并成为制约企业发展的制度瓶颈,传统经济学理论难以有效地破解这一难题。本文试图借用青木昌彦合作博弈理论与模型从利益相关者企业契约论的视角,将企业视为一个具有法律意义的契约集合体,将股东和管理者作为企业的核心利益相关者,从资本投资与利益诉求的角度研究二者的合作博弈关系。同时,在理论分析与模型构建中修正了青木昌彦关于管理者作为企业员工和股东之间的仲裁者身份的基本假设,从利益相关者投资与收益的角度更为清晰地讨论股东和管理者作为不同资本所有者的利益关系,从而有效地破解了传统委托代理理论的悖论。
With the development of market economy and the evolution of business organizations, the relationship between shareholders and managers becomes more and more complicated and becomes the institutional bottleneck restricting the development of enterprises. Traditional economic theory can not effectively solve this problem. This paper attempts to borrow Aoki Masahiko cooperative game theory and model from the perspective of stakeholder firm contract theory, the enterprise as a legal contractual aggregates, the shareholders and managers as the core stakeholders in the business, from the capital investment and Interests from the point of view of the two cooperative game relationship. At the same time, in the theoretical analysis and model construction, Aoki Masahiko revised the basic hypothesis that managers act as the arbiter between the employees and the shareholders, and discussed the shareholders and managers more clearly from the perspective of investment and profit of the stakeholders The relationship between the interests of different capital owners, thus effectively cracking the paradox of traditional principal-agent theory.