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以民营上市公司为研究样本,考察具有政治联系的过度投资与负债融资的双向影响关系。实证结果显示:政治联系会引起企业过度投资;银行贷款对具有政治联系的过度投资不是产生了抑制效应,而是起到了促进作用,商业信用对政治联系引起的过度投资没有显著影响,而长期债务期限结构则能够制约政治联系引起的过度投资行为;政治联系引起的过度会减少未来期间的负债规模,并且延长未来期间的债务期限;负债融资与过度投资之间是双向相互影响关系。
Take private listed companies as a sample to examine the two-way influence of over-investment and debt financing with political connection. The empirical results show that the political connection will lead to overinvestment of enterprises. The overinvestment of bank loans not only has the restraining effect but also the promotion effect. The commercial credit has no significant influence on the overinvestment caused by the political connection. However, the long-term debt The term structure can restrain over-investment caused by political connection. Excessive political relations will reduce the scale of debt in the future and extend the debt maturity in the future. Debt financing and overinvestment are two-way interaction.