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本文以财政支出为主体,研究了我国政府供给偏好(规模与结构)短期决定问题。政治均衡而非经济市场均衡是理解这一问题的关键。在“有管理的竞争性政治市场”和政府追求政治支持最大化等假定下,我们考察了政治均衡决定政府供给偏好的过程及其效率属性,以及“政治价格”在两级“政治市场”上的形成机制。结论表明:政治均衡决定资源配置固有的低效率属性,因政府供给范围的“越位”和“缺位”而加剧。当前改革的重点应是推动经济市场化转轨的完成和公共财政的转型,而非完全的民主化。权威因素对“政治价格”的管理在利益分化严重的当前形势下具有建设性作用。推动渐进民主化,完善权力对等的“二级政治市场”则是长远之策。
This paper takes the financial expenditure as the main body and studies the short-term decision of the government’s supply preference (size and structure) in our country. Political equilibrium rather than economic market equilibrium is the key to understanding this issue. Under the assumption of “a managed and competitive political market” and the government’s pursuit of maximizing political support, we examine the process and efficiency attributes of the political equilibrium in determining the government’s supply preference and the “political prices” at the two levels of “political markets.” The formation mechanism. The conclusion shows that the inequality inherent in the allocation of resources is determined by political equilibrium, which is exacerbated by the “offside” and “absence” of the government supply. The current reform should focus on promoting the completion of the transition to an economic marketization and the transformation of public finances rather than full democratization. The management of the “political price” by the authoritative factor has a constructive function under the current situation where the profit-sharing is grave. The “secondary political market” that promotes gradual democratization and improves the power equivalence is the long-term strategy.