以完全但非完美信息的贝叶斯均衡理论为背景 ,用一个假冒伪劣商品的博弈模型研究了目前中国市场上假冒伪劣商品泛滥的原因 ,分析了企业信誉的损失和市场信誉体制的不完善对成功的效率市场的形成和发展的巨大危害 ,并从企业和市场两个层面探讨了建立信誉市场的可能性。 With the completely but not perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory as the background, this paper uses a game model of fake and shoddy goods to study the reasons for the proliferation of fake and shoddy goods in the Chinese market, and analyzes the loss of reputation and imperfect market reputation system The success of the efficiency of the formation of the market and the tremendous damage to the development, and from both the business and market to explore the possibility of establishing a credit market.