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为推动国家在基层的治理体系和治理能力的现代化,必须优化地方政府的选择性治理行为。本文从组织社会学的视角探求地方政府选择性治理行为的制度根源和优化机制。研究认为中国多层级多地区的治理结构、上下分治的治理体制、地方政府的全能型属性、政府机构责权利的分离趋势、约束机制的失灵是导致地方政府选择性治理的制度原因。选择性治理促进了中国经济的繁盛,维持了中国社会的大一统和稳定;然而,选择性治理的意外后果越来越突出,为此,应该控制政府,限制基层政府的权力,建立有限政府,强化政府部门之间的竞争和监督,引入公民参与和协商机制,实行多中心治理和整体性治理,以推动国家在基层的治理体系和治理能力的现代化。
In order to promote the modernization of the country’s governance system and governance capacity at the grassroots level, it is necessary to optimize the selective governance behavior of local governments. This article explores the institutional roots and optimization mechanisms of the selective governance behavior of local governments from the perspective of organizational sociology. The study considers that the governance structure of multi-level and multi-region in China, the governance system of top and bottom division, the all-around attribute of local government, the trend of separation of responsibilities and interests of government agencies, and the failure of the restraint mechanism are the institutional reasons leading to the selective governance of local governments. Selective governance has promoted the prosperity of China’s economy and maintained the unification and stability of Chinese society. However, the unexpected consequence of selective governance has become increasingly prominent. Therefore, it is necessary to control the government, restrict the power of the grass-roots government, establish a limited government, Strengthen competition and supervision among government departments, introduce a system of citizen participation and consultation, introduce multi-center governance and holistic governance so as to promote the modernization of the country’s governance system and governance capacity at the grassroots level.