通过一个信息非对称的差异化寡头竞争模型,比较了掌握私有信息的知情企业在披露和不披露两种策略下的收益,在此基础上进一步分析行业竞争水平、披露成本两个重要因素对企业最优自愿性信息披露决策的影响。结果表明:披露成本不为零时,知情企业只会对外披露其掌握的较“好”的那部分私有信息;自愿披露的数量与披露成本、行业竞争水平负相关,但与私有信息是关于市场需求的还是关于生产成本的无关。因此得出结论:其一,披露成本不为零是行业竞争水平与自愿披露数量负相关的前提;其二,对文献中竞争水平与披露数量间关系的成立范围有进一步拓展:私有信息不仅可以是行业层面的(市场需求),还可以是企业层面的(生产成本)。由于已有研究认为竞争水平与披露精度正相关,还表明有必要将披露数量与精度分开进行考察。 Through an asymmetric and informationalized oligopolistic competition model, this paper compares the profits of two informed and informed companies with private information under the two strategies of disclosure and non-disclosure. On this basis, it further analyzes the impact of industry competition and disclosure costs on enterprises The Impact of Optimal Voluntary Disclosure on Information Disclosure. The result shows that when the cost of disclosure is not zero, the informed enterprise only discloses the private information which is more “good” than its own. The amount of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the disclosure cost and the level of industry competition, but the private information is About the market demand or about the cost of production has nothing to do. Therefore, the conclusion is drawn as follows: First, the non-zero disclosure cost is a prerequisite for the negative correlation between the level of competition and voluntary disclosure in the industry. Second, the scope of the establishment of the relationship between the level of competition and disclosure in the literature is further expanded. Private information not only Is the industry level (market demand), but also can be the enterprise level (production costs). As previous studies have suggested that the level of competition is positively correlated with disclosure accuracy, it also shows the need to examine the disclosure quantity separately from the accuracy.