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金字塔股权结构是国有企业放权改革的有效途径之一。以2007—2014年中国国有上市公司为研究对象,基于政府放权的视角,实证考察金字塔股权结构对国有企业代理成本的影响。研究发现,随着国有上市公司所处的金字塔层级的增加,其超额代理成本将显著降低,而且这一效应随着城市层面政府干预水平的降低而增强。深入研究表明,超额代理成本对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响,但金字塔层级的减少会弱化这种负向影响。上述结论不仅为理解国有企业金字塔结构的经济后果提供了新的证据,更为提升国有企业的治理效率提供了政策借鉴。
Pyramid ownership structure is one of the effective ways to decentralize SOE reform. Taking the Chinese state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the research object and the government decentralization perspective, this paper empirically examines the impact of the pyramid ownership structure on the agency costs of state-owned enterprises. The study finds that with the increase of the pyramid level of state-owned listed companies, the excess agency costs will be significantly reduced, and this effect will increase with the reduction of government intervention at the urban level. Further research shows that excess agency costs have a significant negative impact on firm performance, but the reduction of the pyramid level will weaken this negative impact. The above conclusion not only provides new evidence for understanding the economic consequences of the pyramid structure of state-owned enterprises, but also provides a policy reference for enhancing the governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises.