对于海德格尔而言,“‘现象学’这个词本来就意味着一个方法概念”。2在《存在与时间》第七节以及马堡讲座《现象学之基本问题》第五节,他都声称自己在讨论方法。但在这些文字中,海德格尔对方法的阐释首先是原则上的而不是操作上的,也就是说,他只阐明了方法论的原则,而没有讨论其施行方式和“运思程序”(Verfahrensweise des Denkens)3。尽管根据海德格尔的意思,具有决定性意义的“方法”从来不是一种对任意现成对象的按部就班的操作,不是“脱离了自己固有的本 For Heidegger, the word ”phenomenology“ would have meant a methodological concept. ” 2 In section VII of “Presence and time” and section V of the Marburg lecture “The basic problems of phenomenology” he claims that he is discussing methods. In these words, however, Heidegger’s interpretation of the method is primarily a matter of principle rather than operation, that is, he only expounds the principle of methodology without discussing the way in which it is applied and the procedure Verfahrensweise des Denkens) 3. Although, according to Heidegger, the decisive “method” is never a step-by-step operation of any ready-made object, it is not that it "divorced itself from its original