受国际贸易中的不完全信息和网络的重要性所启发,我们研究了“网络中介活动”的供给问题。我们假设,那些成为国际贸易中介的行为人首先在他们作为生产和销售雇员期间就积累起了对外交往的网络,然后成为销售这种网络的使用权的创业者。我们报告了支持该假说的结果,该结果来自对国际贸易中介的试点调查。然后,我们建立了一个关于这种创业精神(entrepreneurship)的、简单的一般均衡模型,并使用该模型进行比较静态和福利分析。其中的一个福利结论是:贸易中介可能缺乏足够的激励来维持或扩张其网络。这使人想起这样一个被某些国家所贯彻的政策原理,即:鼓励那些效仿日本综合商社的大型贸易公司的发展。 Inspired by the importance of incomplete information and networks in international trade, we examined the supply of “cyberwar activities.” We assume that those who become agents in international trade first accumulate a network of foreign contacts during their employment as an employee of production and sales, and then become entrepreneurs who sell the right to use such networks. We report the results in support of the hypothesis, which comes from a pilot survey of international trade agents. Then we set up a simple general equilibrium model of this kind of entrepreneurship and use that model for comparative static and welfare analysis. One of the benefits concluded that trade intermediaries may lack sufficient incentives to sustain or expand their network. This is reminiscent of the policy principle pursued by some countries that encourages the development of large trading companies that follow the example of Japanese integrated trading companies.