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在现代企业制度中,代理问题是所有现代企业的本质特征,根源于公司所有权与控制权的分离。但这种代理问题并不是一成不变的,从演化的角度看至少可以分为两大类型的代理问题。在以委托代理为特征的现代公司中,这种代理问题首先表现为股东与经理之间的代理问题。随着股权结构的变化,这种代理问题慢慢地演变为“大股东-小股东”的代理问题。这一演进过程表明,寻求解决代理问题的监管机制也应该随着代理问题的改变而改变。本文对股权分散和股权集中下的两种代理情形进行了分析,并提出了对策。
In the modern enterprise system, the agency problem is the essential characteristic of all modern enterprises, which is rooted in the separation of corporate ownership from control. However, this agency problem is not static, from an evolutionary point of view can be divided into at least two types of agency problems. In the modern corporation characterized by principal-agent, this kind of agency problem first appears as the agency problem between the shareholders and the manager. With the change of ownership structure, this kind of agency problem slowly evolves into the agency problem of “big shareholder - minority shareholder”. This evolutionary process shows that regulatory mechanisms that seek to address agency problems should also change as proxy issues change. This article analyzes the situation of two kinds of agents under decentralized ownership and concentrated ownership, and puts forward countermeasures.