The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once,and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats.In this paper,after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties,we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once.Moreover,we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system (denoted by the probability distribution) and Bayes rule,without requiring simultaneous channels. The rational secret sharing can not be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system (denoted by the probability distribution) and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.