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对1998年~2007年省际面板数据的实证检验表明,在“螺旋式”的“双重”分权过程中,中央政府对地方政府的“纵向”分权对产业结构优化存在显著负效应,而政府对市场的“横向”分权对产业结构优化存在显著正效应。就地区差别而言,东部地区的“纵向”分权抑制了产业结构优化升级,而“横向”分权促进了产业结构优化升级;中部地区“横纵”分权均不利于产业结构优化升级;西部地区的“纵向”分权抑制了产业结构优化升级,而“横向”分权对产业结构优化作用效果不明显。
The empirical test of the inter-provincial panel data from 1998 to 2007 shows that the “vertical” decentralization of the central government to the local government optimizes the industrial structure during the “double” decentralization of the “spiral” There is a significant negative effect, while the government’s “horizontal” decentralization of the market has a significant positive effect on the optimization of industrial structure. In terms of regional differences, the decentralization of the “vertical” power in the eastern region has inhibited the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure, while the decentralization promoted the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure. In the central region, decentralization did not Which is conducive to the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure. The decentralization of the “vertical” power in the western region has inhibited the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure, while the effect of the “horizontal” decentralization on the optimization of industrial structure is not obvious.