在《逻辑研究》的第一版中,胡塞尔不承认存在着一个有别于经验自我的自我,由此他拒绝所有在其中将意识的诸行为认作是源于一个意识生命之中心的理论。意识事实的一个非常重要的层次———意向行为———拥有将经验着的思维与一个对象相联结的特质,但与自我的关联却并非这些行为的本质 In the first edition of Logical Studies, Husserl did not admit that there was a self that differed from the ego of experience, whereby he rejected all the ways in which conscious acts were thought to be derived from the center of a conscious life theory. A very important level of conscious fact - intentional behavior - has the trait of connecting an experienced mind with an object, but the association with the self is not the essence of these behaviors