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股权控制与关系管理是联盟控制的主要方式.围绕联盟效益和稳定的平衡,根据博弈理论从动态视角研究联盟的控制决策.研究结果表明,在动态博弈框架下,联盟的控制特性及稳定性与企业退出期权的持有能力有关.持有退出期权的企业将在联盟中处于优势地位并倾向于运用单一的控制机制——股权控制.没有退出期权的企业则更加依赖关系管理,联盟的股权控制与关系管理呈现互补特征.随着联盟中持有退出期权的企业数目的增加,联盟关系趋向于不稳定.与此同时,未来联盟收益越高,关系管理的作用就越大,两种控制机制的互补性就越强.
Equity control and relationship management are the main ways of alliance control.According to the game theory, the control decision of alliance is studied from the perspective of game theory, and the results show that in the framework of dynamic game, the control characteristics and stability of alliance Enterprises hold the right to withdraw from the option related to the holding of enterprises will be out of the dominant position in the Union and tend to use a single control mechanism - equity control.Exemployed enterprises are more dependent on the relationship between the management of the Union’s equity control And relationship management are complementary features.As the number of enterprises holding the right to withdraw from the alliance, the alliance tends to be unstable.At the same time, the higher the future alliance benefits, the greater the role of relationship management, the two control mechanisms The stronger the complementarity.