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提出在竞争环境下含水层管理的非线性优化模型。模型描述了公共机构通过单一水税率来控制地下水利用所面对的决策问题。模型假设公共机构,即水管理机构的目标是通过对含水层开采获得最大的社会净收益,而地下水使用者在自主决定是否抽水的前提下,其目标是使自己获得最大的净收益。模型效果通过一个简单的数值案例加以说明。所获得的结果可以澄清相对于全权控制和自由竞争,由税收来控制竞争的相对优势和不足。
A nonlinear optimization model of aquifer management under competitive environment is proposed. The model describes the decision-making faced by public agencies in controlling groundwater use through a single water tax rate. The model assumes that the public agency, the water management agency, aims to maximize net social returns for aquifer exploitation, and groundwater users aim to maximize their net benefits, provided they decide to pump or not. The model effect is illustrated by a simple numerical example. The results obtained can clarify the relative strengths and weaknesses of tax control over competition over full control and free competition.