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本文以2005—2013年中国上市公司CEO换届事件为样本,通过构建CEO权力指数划分出CEO更替的四种不同类型,进而对CEO换届公告对股票的公告效应(股票的异常收益率)以及股东财富的影响进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,对大多数公司而言,CEO被迫离职会产生显著的正累积平均异常收益,而权力较大的CEO继任对累积平均异常收益作用比其他几种权力转换类型更大。然而,CEO无权继任时上市公司股价的波动率会显著下降,从而在整体上给股东财富带来了积极的影响。因此,本文认为无权继任是更为合适的CEO权力转换形式。
In this paper, we take the CEO change events of 2005-2013 as a sample, divide the CEO turnover into four different types according to the CEO power index, and then announce the effects of CEO announcement on stock (abnormal return rate of stock) and shareholder wealth The impact of the empirical analysis. Empirical results show that, for most companies, the CEO being forced to leave produces a significant positive cumulative abnormal return, whereas the more powerful CEO succession has a greater effect on the cumulative average abnormal return than the other types of conversion. However, the volatility of the share price of a listed company will not decrease significantly when the CEO has no right to succeed, thus having a positive impact on the shareholder wealth as a whole. Therefore, this article does not consider succession to be a more appropriate form of CEO power conversion.