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本文认为维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》中有一种特殊形式的超越唯心论,即一种非实质性的超越唯心论。这种超越唯心论之所以是非实质性的,是因为它和康德本人的超越唯心论相反,认为不可能存在实质性的先验真理(substantial a priori truth)。但是《逻辑哲学论》虽然在这点上和康德相反,却依然包含着两条超越唯心论的基本洞见,即(a)思想和实在之间的形式同一,和(b)统觉的超越统一性。本文将通过连接《逻辑哲学论》和康德哲学中若干共有的一般性主题来论证(a),并通过细致地解读《逻辑哲学论》5.6及其下辖段落来论证(b)。维特根斯坦在这个段落中讨论了唯我论和形而上主体或者哲学主体(the philosophical self)。按本文的诠释,《逻辑哲学论》中的这种唯我论是一种特殊的、非实质性的超越唯心论。
This article argues that Wittgenstein’s “logical philosophy” contains a special form of transcendental idealism, that is, an immaterial transcendental idealism. This transcendental idealism is immaterial because it is contrary to Kant’s own transcendental idealism, thinking that there is no substantial a priori truth. But “logical philosophical theory”, on the contrary of Kant at this point, still contains two basic insights beyond the idealism: (a) the same form between thought and reality, and (b) the transcendence of unity Sex. This article argues (a) by connecting a number of general themes in “philosophical logic” and Kant’s philosophy and argues (b) by carefully interpreting “logical philosophies” 5.6 and its jurisprudence. In this passage Wittgenstein discusses solipsism and metaphysics or the philosophical self. According to the interpretation of this article, this kind of solipsism in “logical philosophy” is a kind of special and insubstantial transcendental idealism.