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两权分离下,所有者必然要建立一整套激励制度促使经营者与所有者站在同一立场,减少道德风险。激励制度的核心是经营者收入分配的多少或分配方式的选择。根本是要让经营者的收入与所有者的收入挂钩,即与税后利润(或资产净利润率)挂钩,与资本利得(或股份)挂钩。我们这样设计激励制度,要保证其发挥作用,实际上有一个基本假设:经营者除了能从税后利润和资本利得中分享收入外,别无他途。其实。我们也可以作一相反的假设:如果在税后利润和资本利得之外
Under the separation of the two rights, the owner is bound to establish a set of incentive system to encourage the operator and the owner to stand in the same position and reduce the moral hazard. The core of the incentive system is the operator's income distribution or distribution of how much the choice. The fundamental purpose is to link the income of managers to the income of owners, that is, to the after-tax profit (or net asset-net profit) and to the capital gains (or shares). In fact, to assure its effectiveness in designing an incentive system, there is a basic assumption that operators have no other alternative but to share their income from after-tax profits and capital gains. in fact. We can also make the opposite assumption: if after-tax profits and capital gains