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运用重复博弈理论分析区域产业集群内多企业间合作形成的合作激励机制,认为能威慑到有不合作或背叛动机的企业从欺骗均衡转到合作均衡,激励企业间走向制度化合作。分析温州产业集群内的商会组织,发现集群内多个企业受理性驱使经过多次重复博弈可以有效地限制了潜在交易企业的不诚实行为,激励集群内所有企业走向制度化合作,增进企业整体利益,提升区域产业集群的竞争力。
By means of repeated game theory, this paper analyzes the cooperative incentive mechanism formed by the cooperation among multiple enterprises in the regional industrial clusters, and believes that the enterprises that are motivated by the uncooperative or betrayal move from cheating equilibrium to cooperative equilibrium and encouraging enterprises to institutionalize cooperation. Analysis of chambers of commerce in Wenzhou industrial clusters and found that the acceptability of multiple enterprises in the cluster driven repeatedly through repeated games can effectively limit the dishonest behavior of potential trading companies and encourage all enterprises in the cluster to institutionalized cooperation and enhance the overall interests of enterprises , Enhance the competitiveness of regional industrial clusters.