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针对RFID技术使用中下游“搭便车”与上游信息泄露行为导致RFID技术无法顺利在供应链管理中推广的现象,构建由一个供应商对两个零售商组成的考虑RFID投资决策和信息泄露问题的供应链模型。运用Stackelberg博弈模型,研究RFID技术的采用对供应链成员最优行为策略的影响,并在此基础上进一步分析RFID投资决策与供应商信息泄露行为对主导零售商订购决策的影响。通过理论分析与数值算例得出:当主导零售商收益共享率和最优订货量在一定取值范围时,供应商积极参与RFID建设并共同防止供应链信息泄露;产品残值、商品错放率、标签成本、收益共享率等因素会对主导零售商实施RFID技术决策与最优订购量产生不同程度的影响。
The use of middle and lower reaches of RFID technology, “free riding” and upstream information leakage led to RFID technology can not be successfully promoted in the supply chain management phenomenon, to build a supplier by two retailers to consider RFID investment decisions and information leakage The problem of supply chain model. By using Stackelberg game model, this paper studies the effect of RFID technology on the optimal behavior of supply chain members, and then analyzes the influence of RFID investment decision and supplier information leakage on the leading retailer’s ordering decision. Through theoretical analysis and numerical examples, we can conclude that when the revenue sharing rate and the optimal order quantity of the leading retailers are within a certain range, the suppliers actively participate in the RFID construction and jointly prevent the information leakage in the supply chain. The product salvage value and product misplacing Rate, label cost, revenue sharing rate and other factors will lead retailers to implement RFID technology decisions and the optimal order quantity to varying degrees.