论文部分内容阅读
以沪深两市2007—2014年发生非流动资产处置损益的A股上市公司为研究样本,分析非流动资产处置的盈余管理动机以及公司董事会特征对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结果表明:(1)上市公司为了实现扭亏和大清洗的目标,存在利用非流动资产处置收益实施盈余管理的行为;(2)在董事会治理机制中,董事长与总经理两职合一、独立董事比例和董事会开会次数与真实盈余管理水平显著负相关,董事会规模与真实盈余管理水平没有相关关系;(3)相对于民营上市公司,国有上市公司真实盈余管理动机更强,其董事长与总经理两职合一和独立董事比例抑制盈余管理的功能优于民营上市公司,而民营上市公司的董事会开会次数的监督功能更为有效。
Taking the A-share listed companies with non-current assets disposal gains and losses in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2014 as the sample, this paper analyzes the motivation of the earnings management of non-current assets disposal and the restraining effect of the characteristics of the board of directors on the real earnings management. The results show that: (1) In order to achieve the goal of turning losses into profits and cleaning up, the listed companies have the behavior of using earnings from the disposal of non-current assets to implement earnings management; (2) In the governance mechanism of board of directors, the combination of the two roles of chairman and general manager, The proportion of independent directors and the number of meetings held by the board of directors were significantly negatively correlated with the level of real earnings management, and the size of the board of directors was not related to the level of actual earnings management. (3) Compared with private listed companies, the motivation of real earnings management of state- The function of the combination of one director and two independent directors in suppressing the earnings management is superior to that of private listed companies, while the supervision function of the number of board meetings of private listed companies is more effective.