论文部分内容阅读
本文将终极控制人和直接控制人两类大股东的利益动机纳入统一的分析框架,实证考察了大股东自利动机下的资本投资选择与配置效率。研究发现:(1)终极控制人的现金流权比例越低,越有动机增加资本在固定资产、无形资产和长期股权上的自利性投入,导致总体投资规模扩张;(2)地方企业集团投资扩张受终极控制人自利动机的影响最强,央企投资所受影响最弱,民营企业居中;(3)随着控制层级的增加,终极控制人决策权的履行成本增大,企业资本配置行为因直接控制人持股比例高低而表现出“利益攫取”与“利益协同”两种效应;(4)在较高持股比例的收益分配激励下,直接控制人将减少自利性资本投入,抑制过度投资,提高资本配置效率。
This article takes the motivation of the ultimate controlling shareholder and direct controlling shareholder into the unified analysis framework, and empirically examines the capital investment choice and allocation efficiency under the self motive motivation of major shareholders. The findings are as follows: (1) The lower the proportion of ultimate controller’s cash flow rights, the more motivated it is to increase capital self-interest investment in fixed assets, intangible assets and long-term equity, resulting in the expansion of the overall investment scale; (2) Investment expansion has the strongest impact on the ultimate controller’s self-interest motivation, and investment in central SOEs has the weakest impact on private investment. (3) As the control level increases, the ultimate controller’s decision-making power has increased in fulfillment costs and the corporate capital allocation (4) Under the encouragement of income distribution with higher shareholding proportion, the direct controller will reduce the effect of self-control Incentive capital investment, inhibit over-investment, improve capital allocation efficiency.