论文部分内容阅读
In what could be his swansong work， 92-year-old Henry Kissinger， former U.S. Secretary of State and one of the world’s foremost authorities on China-U.S. relations， puts forth his vision for the shape of things to come for China， the United States and the world at large. So far， the book， World Order， has been warmly received in Western media circles. In the following piece， Huang Renwei， Vice President of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences， presents the view from the opposite side of the fence：
In his latest work， Kissinger candidly and with a measure of pride depicts how the current U.S.-dominated， hegemonic world order came into being. Military power and economic strength constitute the two pillars of the U.S. strategy to maintain the world order as it stands. The United States still takes the lead in terms of these instruments of hard power. By availing itself of various key events in the world’s modern history， the country has grown into a global superpower. The core goal of its global strategy has been to build up and maintain a world order guided by its influence. That is why the United States offered a huge supply of “international public goods” after World War II， while at the same time， it launched five large-scale regional wars and undertook scores of military actions， for some of which it has paid a huge price.
Kissinger admits that in the long run， the huge gap between its own hard power and soft power will make it difficult for his country to maintain its status as the world’s sole superpower. The United States has found itself in a dilemma primarily related to the issues of power and legitimacy. Neither its principle of“universality” nor the U.S. model of governance has been as operational and legitimate as the country may have wished in other countries， particularly in the developing world. As a result， the country’s dominance and the extant world order are faced with overwhelming challenges.
The U.S. concept of world order is increasingly losing the support and sympathy of other countries. Even its European allies often ideologically deviate from it in many aspects. The more the country tries to impose its values and system of governance upon other countries， the larger the morass the international order will find itself stuck in. Americans themselves have begun to question whether or not the propagandizing of “democracy” outside the United States is really in the country’s best interests. Kissinger believes that the United States needs to reassess the adaptability of the U.S.-style worldview and then set new objectives， address new questions， seek new driving forces and gain new sources of support. To some extent， the rebuilding of the world order necessitates “deAmericanizing，” so that the concept of world order will not be as fraught as it at present is with associations of aggression and self-interest， thus allowing it to be more readily recognized by a greater number of countries. Is it possible for the United States to realize this strategic change？ Kissinger answers in the affirmative. A study of U.S. diplomatic history reveals a continuous process of coping with challenges and adjusting strategies.
Asian order
Kissinger focuses two chapters on the diversity inherent in the current Asian order in addition to the impact that China’s rise has had on it. He concludes that the core issue in the Asian order boils down to a question of partnership or confrontation. He summarizes several features of the Asian order by reflecting on both history and the present reality. Asian countries belong to different sub-regions， and within these regions， they differ from one another considerably in terms of social and cultural structures. Diplomatic policies based on these countries’national interests play a predominant role. American factors have also always exerted an influence upon Asia’s regional order. In order to prevent a power vacuum or imbalances， the United States has tried to strike a balance among large regional powers.
Kissinger argues that the rise of emerging countries in Asia in the 21st century has incurred strong nationalist sentiments within these states. While much emphasis has been placed on national sovereignty and these countries’ core interests， a non-zero-sum cooperation mechanism is also taking shape. The Asian order has posed structural challenges to the world order， calling into question whether or not a trans-Pacific partnership can be established.
Against this backdrop， Kissinger makes a strategic analysis of China’s interaction with the current international order.
Historically speaking， China’s concept of order did not pose challenges to its Western counterpart. From Kissinger’s perspective， among Asian countries， China’s concept of international order is the closest to that of the West. China’s concept of order， which dates back thousands of years， was never offensive or aggressive in orientation， and even the Great Wall was originally construed as a defensive construction. China did not export its governmental systems， but it was skilled at assimilating foreign culture and approximating it for its own ends. Entering the modern era， while attempting to resist being overly influenced by Western culture， the Chinese also accepted it.
Since the late 1970s， China has been integrating itself into the current international order rather than challenging it. Kissinger makes an analysis of contemporary China’s dual mindsets toward the existing international order. On the one hand， the reform and opening-up policy initiated by late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has helped push China onto the global stage， and transform it into the world’s second largest economy within the span of one generation. On the other， China has been forced to accept international norms， rules and responsibilities. The country is awaiting the arrival of changes while at the same time， it is becoming increasingly active in the international sphere and undertaking an increasing number of obligations. The country now shares more instead of fewer commonalities with the rest of the world. Kissinger’s judgment is that China’s rise in the 21st century is the result of the marriage between an ancient civilization and a contemporary international system， rather than a case of one world order oppressing another. Despite differences in the two countries’respective concepts of world order， China and the United States still share things in common. In the book， Kissinger expounds on the differences and similarities between the two countries’ ways of looking at the world. As indispensable pillars in maintaining world order， China and the United States have arrived at divergent judgments of the current system， but both bear their respective obligations. When it comes to the issue of how to maintain a lasting relationship with each other， both countries sorely lack experience and precedents. China possesses a similar territorial size and economic scale to the United States， but it has a different domestic model of governance. Americans prefer direct reactions to the current environment， while the Chinese tend to concentrate on gradual changes. Americans are used to formulating a detailed agenda to tackle issues， whereas the Chinese are more accustomed to proposing a major fundamental principle that can guide the process of solving problems. Both the Chinese and the Americans believe they are exceptional in the world， and it is only in recent years that the two countries have had to get used to sharing the same international space. Regardless of whether these two become rivals or partners， they will impose a significant influence on the formation of the world order in the 21st century.
Notably， both countries are trying to avoid strategic conflicts， with a view to pushing forward the “new model of major power relationship.” Owing to China’s rapid rise， international commentators often express doubts if the United States will be able to avoid repeating historical tragedies. Kissinger believes， by putting forward that new vision， the two countries have suggested a strategy that may represent the only conceivable way of preventing this from happening. Leaderships in both countries have admitted that the two countries share common interests and are trying to build up a strategic partnership in the Pacific region. Both are committed to building a constructive world order from the ground up.
Kissinger’s understanding of the “new model of major power relationship” is a combination of a balance of power and partnership among big powers. Although it somewhat differs from China’s principles of “non-conflict， non-confrontation， mutual respect and win-win cooperation，” his thinking is probably redolent of a shift from the United States’ old mentality， which features over-dependence on a system of accruing allies. Kissinger does not shy away from talking about the possibility that the two countries might make divergent choices with respect to the international order. A series of huge hindrances must be removed in order to avoid a tense relationship between the established superpower and the rising power. Kissinger points out that the rebalance of the Asia-Pacific region should not be defined by military factors， and boundaries should not be largely decided by military deployments. Also， persistent U.S. attempts to promote “democracy” and “universal values” in Asia may fuel tensions between China and the United States. Kissinger’s suggestion is that even if no compromises can be achieved in determining the course that the international order will take， the leaderships of both countries are obligated to prevent the differences from slipping into strategic confrontations.
It could be argued that Kissinger’s suggested strategic adjustments and innovative thinking on the subject of the emerging new world order could help reduce and even eradicate the two countries’ strategic differences， so as to place the ongoing transformation in the Asian order and the world order on a stable and progressive route. More specifically， the possibility of maintaining peace hinges on the ability of the two countries to exercise self-restraint in pursuing goals and to confine competition within political and diplomatic areas. If the two countries can reach greater consensus on the concept of international order， we may expect to see a more stable framework underlying the relationship between China and the United States， which will further help lay a foundation for the construction of a community of shared interests between the two countries. This is where the real value of Kissinger’s new book World Order lies.
In his latest work， Kissinger candidly and with a measure of pride depicts how the current U.S.-dominated， hegemonic world order came into being. Military power and economic strength constitute the two pillars of the U.S. strategy to maintain the world order as it stands. The United States still takes the lead in terms of these instruments of hard power. By availing itself of various key events in the world’s modern history， the country has grown into a global superpower. The core goal of its global strategy has been to build up and maintain a world order guided by its influence. That is why the United States offered a huge supply of “international public goods” after World War II， while at the same time， it launched five large-scale regional wars and undertook scores of military actions， for some of which it has paid a huge price.
Kissinger admits that in the long run， the huge gap between its own hard power and soft power will make it difficult for his country to maintain its status as the world’s sole superpower. The United States has found itself in a dilemma primarily related to the issues of power and legitimacy. Neither its principle of“universality” nor the U.S. model of governance has been as operational and legitimate as the country may have wished in other countries， particularly in the developing world. As a result， the country’s dominance and the extant world order are faced with overwhelming challenges.
The U.S. concept of world order is increasingly losing the support and sympathy of other countries. Even its European allies often ideologically deviate from it in many aspects. The more the country tries to impose its values and system of governance upon other countries， the larger the morass the international order will find itself stuck in. Americans themselves have begun to question whether or not the propagandizing of “democracy” outside the United States is really in the country’s best interests. Kissinger believes that the United States needs to reassess the adaptability of the U.S.-style worldview and then set new objectives， address new questions， seek new driving forces and gain new sources of support. To some extent， the rebuilding of the world order necessitates “deAmericanizing，” so that the concept of world order will not be as fraught as it at present is with associations of aggression and self-interest， thus allowing it to be more readily recognized by a greater number of countries. Is it possible for the United States to realize this strategic change？ Kissinger answers in the affirmative. A study of U.S. diplomatic history reveals a continuous process of coping with challenges and adjusting strategies.
Asian order
Kissinger focuses two chapters on the diversity inherent in the current Asian order in addition to the impact that China’s rise has had on it. He concludes that the core issue in the Asian order boils down to a question of partnership or confrontation. He summarizes several features of the Asian order by reflecting on both history and the present reality. Asian countries belong to different sub-regions， and within these regions， they differ from one another considerably in terms of social and cultural structures. Diplomatic policies based on these countries’national interests play a predominant role. American factors have also always exerted an influence upon Asia’s regional order. In order to prevent a power vacuum or imbalances， the United States has tried to strike a balance among large regional powers.
Kissinger argues that the rise of emerging countries in Asia in the 21st century has incurred strong nationalist sentiments within these states. While much emphasis has been placed on national sovereignty and these countries’ core interests， a non-zero-sum cooperation mechanism is also taking shape. The Asian order has posed structural challenges to the world order， calling into question whether or not a trans-Pacific partnership can be established.
Against this backdrop， Kissinger makes a strategic analysis of China’s interaction with the current international order.
Historically speaking， China’s concept of order did not pose challenges to its Western counterpart. From Kissinger’s perspective， among Asian countries， China’s concept of international order is the closest to that of the West. China’s concept of order， which dates back thousands of years， was never offensive or aggressive in orientation， and even the Great Wall was originally construed as a defensive construction. China did not export its governmental systems， but it was skilled at assimilating foreign culture and approximating it for its own ends. Entering the modern era， while attempting to resist being overly influenced by Western culture， the Chinese also accepted it.
Since the late 1970s， China has been integrating itself into the current international order rather than challenging it. Kissinger makes an analysis of contemporary China’s dual mindsets toward the existing international order. On the one hand， the reform and opening-up policy initiated by late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has helped push China onto the global stage， and transform it into the world’s second largest economy within the span of one generation. On the other， China has been forced to accept international norms， rules and responsibilities. The country is awaiting the arrival of changes while at the same time， it is becoming increasingly active in the international sphere and undertaking an increasing number of obligations. The country now shares more instead of fewer commonalities with the rest of the world. Kissinger’s judgment is that China’s rise in the 21st century is the result of the marriage between an ancient civilization and a contemporary international system， rather than a case of one world order oppressing another. Despite differences in the two countries’respective concepts of world order， China and the United States still share things in common. In the book， Kissinger expounds on the differences and similarities between the two countries’ ways of looking at the world. As indispensable pillars in maintaining world order， China and the United States have arrived at divergent judgments of the current system， but both bear their respective obligations. When it comes to the issue of how to maintain a lasting relationship with each other， both countries sorely lack experience and precedents. China possesses a similar territorial size and economic scale to the United States， but it has a different domestic model of governance. Americans prefer direct reactions to the current environment， while the Chinese tend to concentrate on gradual changes. Americans are used to formulating a detailed agenda to tackle issues， whereas the Chinese are more accustomed to proposing a major fundamental principle that can guide the process of solving problems. Both the Chinese and the Americans believe they are exceptional in the world， and it is only in recent years that the two countries have had to get used to sharing the same international space. Regardless of whether these two become rivals or partners， they will impose a significant influence on the formation of the world order in the 21st century.
Notably， both countries are trying to avoid strategic conflicts， with a view to pushing forward the “new model of major power relationship.” Owing to China’s rapid rise， international commentators often express doubts if the United States will be able to avoid repeating historical tragedies. Kissinger believes， by putting forward that new vision， the two countries have suggested a strategy that may represent the only conceivable way of preventing this from happening. Leaderships in both countries have admitted that the two countries share common interests and are trying to build up a strategic partnership in the Pacific region. Both are committed to building a constructive world order from the ground up.
Kissinger’s understanding of the “new model of major power relationship” is a combination of a balance of power and partnership among big powers. Although it somewhat differs from China’s principles of “non-conflict， non-confrontation， mutual respect and win-win cooperation，” his thinking is probably redolent of a shift from the United States’ old mentality， which features over-dependence on a system of accruing allies. Kissinger does not shy away from talking about the possibility that the two countries might make divergent choices with respect to the international order. A series of huge hindrances must be removed in order to avoid a tense relationship between the established superpower and the rising power. Kissinger points out that the rebalance of the Asia-Pacific region should not be defined by military factors， and boundaries should not be largely decided by military deployments. Also， persistent U.S. attempts to promote “democracy” and “universal values” in Asia may fuel tensions between China and the United States. Kissinger’s suggestion is that even if no compromises can be achieved in determining the course that the international order will take， the leaderships of both countries are obligated to prevent the differences from slipping into strategic confrontations.
It could be argued that Kissinger’s suggested strategic adjustments and innovative thinking on the subject of the emerging new world order could help reduce and even eradicate the two countries’ strategic differences， so as to place the ongoing transformation in the Asian order and the world order on a stable and progressive route. More specifically， the possibility of maintaining peace hinges on the ability of the two countries to exercise self-restraint in pursuing goals and to confine competition within political and diplomatic areas. If the two countries can reach greater consensus on the concept of international order， we may expect to see a more stable framework underlying the relationship between China and the United States， which will further help lay a foundation for the construction of a community of shared interests between the two countries. This is where the real value of Kissinger’s new book World Order lies.