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为研究我国煤矿企业安全生产管制效果影响因素和管制力度相对不足的问题,构建中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和煤矿员工四方博弈模型。模型分析结果表明:地方政府对煤炭企业的监管效果受到企业预期损失、安全生产管理成本和中央政府给予举报者的奖金额的影响。从而,可以得出结论:大多数中小煤矿企业有其自发管理的动力,地方政府监管力度较低;企业需要改进管理方法,降低管理成本,合理制定员工事故赔偿额标准,降低员工的遵守规章的难度,并适度提高对员工遵守规章行为的奖励力度,以降低员工从事不安全生产行为的概率。
In order to study the problem of the influencing factors and control of coal mine production safety in China, the paper builds a four-party game model of the central government, local governments, coal mining enterprises and coal mine workers. The result of model analysis shows that the supervision effect of local government on coal enterprises is affected by the expected loss of enterprises, the cost of production safety management and the amount of prize given by the central government to whistleblowers. Therefore, we can conclude that: Most small and medium-sized coal mines have the motivation for their spontaneous management and local government supervision is relatively low; enterprises need to improve management methods, reduce management costs, rationally set employee accident compensation standards, and reduce employee compliance with regulations Difficulty, and moderately increase incentives for employees to comply with rules and regulations to reduce the probability of employees engaging in unsafe production practices.