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近年来,土地财政和地方融资平台的出现使得现有财政体制对地方政府行为的约束出现软化的迹象。在这一制度环境下,地方政府在制定相机性财政政策时更少地基于稳定地区经济考虑,而更大程度上是为了争取财政收入和地区利益。这使地方政府的财政活动长期呈现出较大的随机性特征,不利于地区经济稳定。通过对地方政府的财政政策进行分解,利用我国省级面板数据发现,地方政府的相机性财政政策对异常消费具有一定的平抑作用,但加剧了异常投资的波动。相对消费波动,投资波动是经济波动的主要来源。所以我国地方政府的相机性财政政策实际上隐含了较大的经济波动风险。这一结论为下一步财政体制改革中注重构建对地方政府经济活动的内生制度约束提供了经验支撑。
In recent years, the advent of land finance and local financing platform has made the existing fiscal system soften the constraints on local government behavior. In this institutional environment, local governments are less likely to base their efforts on stabilizing regional economic considerations in formulating a camera-based fiscal policy and, to a greater extent, for fiscal revenue and regional benefits. This makes the local government's financial activities have long shown a large random characteristics, is not conducive to regional economic stability. By decomposing the local government's fiscal policy and using the data of the provincial panel in our country, it is found that the local government's camera-based fiscal policy has a certain degree of stabilizing effect on abnormal consumption, but exacerbated the volatility of abnormal investment. Relative volatility in consumption, investment volatility is the main source of economic fluctuations. Therefore, the local government's fiscal policy in our country actually imposes a greater risk of economic fluctuations. This conclusion provides empirical support for the next step in the reform of the fiscal system focusing on building an endogenous institutional constraint on the economic activity of local governments.