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本文通过构建信号传递模型,研究了企业家财富、不对称信息和企业中权力分配三者之间的关系。文章指出,企业家可以通过两种方式向投资者传递其私有信息,一是向企业中投入一定的自有资本,二是将部分控制权让渡给投资者。这两种信号传递工具相互之间存在一定的替代性,但对于优质企业家而言具有不同的成本。在分离均衡条件下,企业家向企业中投入自有财富所产生的分离成本,要小于将控制权让渡给投资者所带来的分离成本,所以企业家更偏好于选择向企业中投入自有财富来传递私有信息。本研究对企业中控制权的“相机转移”现象提供了一个更为合理的解释。
This paper studies the relationship between entrepreneur wealth, asymmetric information and the distribution of power in the enterprise by constructing a signaling model. The article points out that entrepreneurs can pass on their private information to investors in two ways. First, they invest some self-owned capital in the enterprise. Second, they transfer some of their control rights to investors. These two signaling tools are somewhat alternative to each other, but have different costs for high-quality entrepreneurs. Under the condition of separation and equilibrium, the separation costs incurred by entrepreneurs in investing their own wealth in the enterprise are smaller than the separation costs brought by the transfer of control to investors. Therefore, entrepreneurs prefer to invest in enterprises from Have the wealth to pass on private information. This study provides a more reasonable explanation of the “camera shift ” phenomenon in corporate control.