论文部分内容阅读
本研究使用1996—2007年新泽西州178个K—12学区的固定样本数据,对制度差异如何影响学校的预算决策进行了实证研究。通过内韦西模型(Newey-West),修正异方差和序列相关,所获研究结果支持了我们的假设:相比任命校董会的学区(Ⅰ类学区),选举校董会的学区(Ⅱ类学区)在降低学校支出方面更为有效。本研究从新制度经济学的角度对学校系统进行研究,结果证明,管理制度上的差异是引起预算决策差异的关键因素,这个过程是通过影响公共官员所面临的激励结构、交易费用和代理费用而实现的。对实践工作者的启示时至今日,对公共行政领域里的许多学者和实践工作者来说,制度差异对地方预算决策的影响问题都一直是一个富有争议的话题。这意味着通过明确校董会在制定学校预算决策时所负有的责任,学区的直接选举制度可以成为控制不断攀升的教育费用的有效工具,它既是有效的激励结构,也是一种约束机制。在财政压力下,地方政府有效管理预算会受到挑战,从而导致制度变迁,政策制定者应该考虑制定与这种制度变迁相伴的可行的策略。
Using fixed sample data from 178 K-12 districts in New Jersey during 1996-2007, this study examines how institutional differences affect the school’s budgetary decisions. Using Newey-West model, we can correct heteroscedasticity and sequence correlation. Our findings support our hypothesis. Compared with the school district (Type I) appointed by the school council, the school district (Ⅱ) Geographic area) is more effective at reducing school expenses. The study of the school system from the perspective of the new institutional economics, the results show that differences in management system is the key factor that caused the discrepancy between budget decisions. This process is through the influence of public officials incentive structure, transaction costs and agency costs Achieve. Implications for Practitioners To date, many scholars and practitioners in the field of public administration have always been a topic of controversy over the impact of institutional differences on local budgetary decisions. This means that by clarifying the responsibility of school management committees in formulating school budget decisions, the district direct election system can be an effective instrument for controlling the rising cost of education. It is both an effective incentive structure and a restraining mechanism. Under financial pressure, local governments will be challenged to manage their budgets effectively, leading to institutional changes that policymakers should consider formulating viable strategies that accompany such institutional changes.