论文部分内容阅读
通过构建地方政府与当地炒房者间一个主从微分对策的经济学模型,两类成因相异的Bang-Coast控制得到了研究:(1)两个局中人“同时”改变策略的Bang-Coast控制;(2)局中人之间的牵制作用形成的不满足奇异弧的Coast控制。并获得结论:地方政府的动态房产税税率应尽可能与炒房者行为同步,且采取连续渐变为宜;即使囤房行为被完全抑制,政府仍有必要维持一个抑制囤房再度兴起的动态临界税率;为避免房产税被转嫁,政府应以高税率开征。
Two types of Bang-Coast control with different causes are studied by constructing an economic model of the principal and subordinate differential between the local government and the local real estate speculators: (1) The strategy of “changing people at the same time” Bang-Coast control; (2) Coastal control that does not satisfy the singular arc caused by the intervening effect between players. And concluded that the dynamic tax rate of the local government should be synchronized with the behavior of the real estate speculators as far as possible, and the continuous gradient should be adopted. Even if the hoarding behavior is completely suppressed, the government still needs to maintain a dynamic criticality that inhibits the resurgence of the hoarding Tax rates; to avoid the property tax being passed on, the government should start with a high tax rate.