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本文认为,资产经营责任制虽然强化了企业经营者的风险责任,从而在一定程度上增强了企业行为的自我约束性,但是它并不能使企业行为约束硬化。原因主要在于生产经营责任制立足于经营成果的分配,而不是或不完全是立足于生产经营行为控制本身,另外加上其它因素,使经营者不能完全做到独立地对经营行为及结果负责。要改变这一状况的关键在做到“以收抵支,自负盈亏”,形成以独立的财产关系为基础的、具有硬性行为约束功能的经营系统。作者认为,股份制是达到这一目的的经济形式之一。作者从股份制企业在经济责任关系上的特点分析了其硬化企业行为约束的功能及实质,并与生产经营责任制进行了对比。
This article believes that although the asset management responsibility system strengthens the risk responsibilities of the company’s managers, and thus enhances the self-restraint of the company’s behavior to a certain extent, it does not constrain the firm’s behavior. The main reason is that the responsibility system for production and operation is based on the distribution of operating results. It is not or not entirely based on the control of production and business operations. In addition, other factors make it impossible for operators to be completely responsible for their business operations and results. The key to changing this situation is to achieve “acceptance and self-financing” and form a business system with rigid behavioral constraints based on independent property relations. The author believes that the joint stock system is one of the economic forms to achieve this goal. The author analyzes the function and essence of the behavioral constraints of the firming firm from the characteristics of the joint-stock company’s economic responsibility, and compares it with the responsibility system for production and management.