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人们理解过去的方式,理解过去意识的方式以及历史意识生成的方式因文化和文明的不同而有所变化,接受这一事实能够让我们从一种不同于黑格尔对待历史的角度来考量印度的itihasa观念,也因而排除了它在世界历史这一极权主义标题下所包含的东西。印度人怎样以不同的方式“对待”他们的历史?他们编织其话语和对过去的理解有什么样的特点?他们不同于西方或中国人的对历史概念的理解,会使南亚次大陆“与过去遭遇”的意识以及“被过去推动”的方式不具有合法性且低人一等吗?本文对itihasa的特性进行了详细的阐述,指出应当在比较史学的话语内重新认识其方法论和意识形态上的说服力。
The fact that people understand past patterns, understand past patterns of consciousness, and ways of generating historical consciousness varies with cultures and civilizations, and acceptance of this fact allows us to consider India in a way that is different from Hegel’s treatment of history Itihasa concept, thus excluding what it contains under the title of totalitarianism in world history. How are Indians differently “treating” their history? What are their characteristics of weaving their discourse and understanding of the past? They differ from the Western or Chinese understanding of the concept of history in that they make the South Asian subcontinent Is it not legal and inferior to have the awareness of “past encounters” and “the past pushed”? This paper elaborates on the characteristics of itihasa, and points out that it is necessary to re-understand its methodology in the discourse of comparative historiography Ideological persuasion.