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文章基于公共物品私人供给的模型,构建了新农村建设时期乡村红色文化遗产保护过程中村民在个体理性支配下同集体理性进行博弈的分析框架,并据此对实践中存在的保护政策失效和村民间保护意愿差异的现象进行了解析。结论认为,村民在个体理性支配下的博弈行为符合福利经济学基本理论,构成了保护政策失效的主要原因;为此,结合村民的行为特点和福利经济学的分析,引入了法律保护机制以探求思路和对策。
Based on the model of private supply of public goods, the article constructs an analytical framework of villagers playing a collective game with individual rationality in the protection process of rural red cultural heritage during the new rural construction period. Based on this, The differences in civil protection will be analyzed. The conclusion is that the villagers ’game behavior under the individual rationality conforms to the basic theory of welfare economics and constitutes the main reason for the failure of protection policies. To this end, combining the villagers’ behavior characteristics and the analysis of welfare economics, this paper introduces the legal protection mechanism to explore Ideas and Countermeasures.