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经理的机会主义引发企业过度投资行为。西方学者通过考察投资与现金流相关性,研究企业过度投资问题并找到相应经验证据。本文利用上市公司(2005会计年度)数据,研究制造业上市公司是否存在过度投资行为以及相关制约机制是否有效。结果表明:我国上市公司存在过度投资行为;经理持股、举借债务、大股东性质、现金股利是过度投资行为的有效制约机制;公司治理机制中的独立董事并未发挥作用。
Managers opportunism triggered over-investment in the enterprise. Western scholars study the relationship between investment and cash flow to study the problem of over-investment in enterprises and find the corresponding empirical evidence. In this paper, we use the data of listed companies (FY2005) to study whether there is over-investment in listed manufacturing companies and whether the relevant control mechanism is effective. The results show that: the listed companies in our country have over-investment behavior; managers holding shares, borrowing debts, the nature of major shareholders and cash dividends are effective restraining mechanisms of excessive investment behavior; and the independent directors in the corporate governance mechanism have no effect.