学术界多从晋升激励角度解释地方官员发展经济的热情。但是经典的晋升激励模型存在着激励扭曲。激励扭曲可以分为努力方向扭曲和努力程度扭曲,现有文献对于前者给予了高度关注,而对于后者则有着较大的研究空白。通过将官员异质性因素引入传统的晋升激励模型,可以从理论上发现地区资源禀赋、行动次序等因素都会引起官员努力程度的扭曲(即“偷懒”)。但是现实中,各地官员却有着高涨的发展经济的激情和GDP崇拜。理论与现实出现了一定的差异,问题的关键在于官员隐性激励。在封闭的政治内部劳动力市场上,由声誉激励构成的隐性激励也是促使地方官员努力发展本地经济的重要机制,它构成了显性晋升激励的有效补充,使得地方官员不至于产生那些努力扭曲。 Many scholars explain the enthusiasm of local officials in economic development from the perspective of promotion and incentive. However, there are incentive distortions in the classic promotion incentive model. Incentive twisting can be divided into distorting efforts and distorting efforts. The existing literatures give great attention to the former, while the latter have a larger research blank. By introducing official heterogeneity factors into the traditional promotion incentive model, it can be found theoretically that factors such as regional resource endowments and the order of actions cause distortions in officials’ efforts (ie “lazy”). However, in reality, officials everywhere have great enthusiasm for economic development and GDP worship. There are some differences between theory and reality. The crux of the problem lies in the implicit encouragement of officials. In a closed political internal labor market, implicit incentives formed by reputational incentives are also an important mechanism for local officials to work hard to develop the local economy. They constitute an effective supplement to explicit promotion incentives, so that local officials are not forced to distort them.