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研究委托人关于多项任务边际互补情况下的多任务锦标赛问题,建立了以委托人收益最大化为目标的多任务锦标赛模型。在此基础上讨论代理人的异质性(代理人能力不同)和任务的异质性(单个代理人关于各项任务的边际成本不同)对代理人行动选择的影响。结果表明当代理人和任务均同质时,所有代理人会在所有任务上都实施最优努力水平;当代理人同质但是任务不同质时,代理人均不会实施最优努力水平,而且在边际成本较高的任务上的努力高于最优水平,而在边际成本较低的任务上的努力低于最优水平;当代理人不同质任务同质或者代理人与任务均不同质的情况下,锦标赛报酬对代理人的激励失效。
This paper studies the multi-task tournament under the circumstance of multiple tasks complement each other, and establishes the multi-task tournament model that aims to maximize the return of the principal. On the basis of this, we will discuss the influence of agent heterogeneity (agent capacity difference) and task heterogeneity (individual agent's different marginal cost on each task) on agent action choice. The results show that when the agent and the task are homogeneous, all the agents perform the best effort level on all the tasks; when the agent is homogeneous but the task is not homogeneous, the agent will not implement the optimal level of effort, and at Efforts on tasks with higher marginal costs are above optimal but efforts at tasks with lower marginal costs are below optimal levels. When agents are not homogeneously assigned to different tasks or both agents and tasks are not homogeneous Next, the tournament reward invalidation of the incentive agent.