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本文利用斯坦伯格博弈模型来描述供应链主体决策的相互作用机制,并在此基础上,构建了供应链融资和运营的联合决策框架。本文重点关注运营优化前提下供应链融资在量上的需求,而融资利率仅仅作为由银行决定的外生变量被引入到模型之中。定性分析表明供应链存在实际均衡和整体最优两种状态,实际均衡状态下供应链存在绩效缺口,其整体利润水平显著低于理论最优状态下的利润总量。而在供应链由实际均衡状态向整体最优状态的动态迁移过程中,最优融资需求可能单调递增、单调下降或者先上升后下降。实证分析则表明融资需求的动态变动过程更加复杂,在呈现先上升后下降的趋势之外,还有一个再度上升的过程。
In this paper, Stanford game model is used to describe the interaction mechanism of the main supply chain decision-making, and on this basis, a joint decision-making framework of supply chain financing and operation is constructed. This paper focuses on the demand for supply chain financing under the premise of operational optimization, and the financing interest rate is only introduced into the model as an exogenous variable determined by the bank. Qualitative analysis shows that the supply chain has two kinds of states: the actual equilibrium and the overall optimal one. In the actual equilibrium state, the supply chain has a performance gap, and its overall profit level is significantly lower than the total amount under the optimal theoretical state. In the process of dynamic migration of the supply chain from the actual equilibrium state to the overall optimal state, the optimal financing demand may monotonically increase, monotonically decrease or rise first and then decrease. Empirical analysis shows that the process of dynamic changes in financing needs is more complicated, and there is another upward trend beyond the trend of first increasing and then decreasing.