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以两阶段资金约束型供应链作为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,主要研究保兑仓模式下两级供应链期末返利契约的参数设计问题.首先构建了面向资金约束下银行直接贷款时供应链期末返利契约模型,作为模式比较的基础.然后,定量化建立了保兑仓模式下期末返利契约协调模型,该模型以制造商作为供应链的主导企业,承担全部的经营风险.引入银行作为第三方展开融资业务,以制造商信用作为基础,为零售商提供运营资金.应用Stackelberg博弈模型求解出保兑仓模式下银行、制造商、零售商总体利益最大化下最优的订货量、批发价格以及期末增量单位返利数量值.通过运算发现,在保兑仓模式下,制造商的最优批发价小于直接融资模式下的制造商批发价,由于制造商承担全部风险,致使零售商订货量增加,同时制造商利润上升,从而使整个供应链的利润随之上升.
Taking the two-stage fund-constrained supply chain as the research object and retailer’s operating fund shortage as the precondition, this paper mainly studies the parametric design of the two-stage supply chain rebate contract at the end of the term.Firstly, At the end of the supply chain, the rebate contract model at the end of the loan is used as the basis for the comparison of the modes.Secondly, the coordination model of the rebate contract at the end of the contract period is established quantitatively, taking the manufacturer as the leading enterprise in the supply chain and undertaking all the operational risks. Introduce the bank as a third party to start the financing business and provide the retailer with the working credit based on the manufacturer credit.Using the Stackelberg game model to solve the optimal order under the maximization of the overall benefit of the bank, the manufacturer and the retailer Quantity, wholesale price and quantity of rebates in the period-end incremental units.It is found through calculation that the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is smaller than the manufacturer’s wholesale price under the direct financing mode in the confirmatory warehouse mode, and because the manufacturer assumes all the risks, Retailer orders increase, while the manufacturer profits rise, so that the entire supply chain profits with Rise.