论文部分内容阅读
企业创新具有高失败概率、获取专用性知识、信息不对称程度高的特征,适应常规性决策的薪酬无法激励高管从事创新活动。从薪酬回报非对称敏感性的角度分析,为了激励高管从事创新,股东能否容忍回报下降。结论显示,与传统产业内的企业相比,创新型企业高管的薪酬回报非对称敏感性更弱;与实施应用式创新的企业相比,实施探索式创新企业高管的薪酬回报非对称敏感性更弱;控股股东的创新意愿越强,高管的薪酬回报非对称敏感性越弱。结论表明,为激励高管承担创新风险,股东展现出对回报下降更高的容忍度。
Enterprise innovation has a high probability of failure, access to specialized knowledge, the characteristics of a high degree of asymmetric information, pay to adapt to conventional decision-making can not inspire executives engaged in innovative activities. From the perspective of asymmetric pay-return sensitivity, whether shareholders can tolerate a drop in returns in order to motivate executives to engage in innovation. The results show that asymmetric remuneration of innovation-oriented executives is weaker than that of traditional firms and asymmetric sensitivity of remuneration returns to executives of discovery-innovation firms compared with firms implementing applied innovation Weaker sex; the stronger will of controlling shareholders in innovation, the weaker the sensitivity of the executive’s salary asymmetry. The conclusion shows that to motivate executives to take on innovation risks, shareholders show greater tolerance for the decline in returns.