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会计信息披露理论认为,自愿性信息披露通过降低投资者和内部人间的信息不对称,优化资源分配和降低资本成本,然而这种效应又依赖于自愿性信息披露可观察到的可信度。由于管理者的自我服务意图,自愿性信息披露的可信度事前很难保障,投资者可能从管理者传递的其他信号推断该自愿性信息披露的可信度。也就是说,会计信息被信息提供者披露并被信息使用者接收,进而在资本市场产生反应,不仅要求会计信息本身具备某种质量特征,还取决于信息使用者对会计信息可信度的主观评价。因此只有以信息使用者可信的方式披露具备质量特征的会计信息,才有助于资本市场资源的有效配置。
Accounting information disclosure theory holds that voluntary disclosure reduces the credibility of information disclosure by reducing the asymmetric information between investors and insiders, optimizing resource allocation and reducing the cost of capital. However, this effect depends on the observable credibility of voluntary disclosure. Due to the managers’ self-service intention, the credibility of voluntary disclosure is difficult to guarantee in advance, and investors may deduce the credibility of the voluntary disclosure from other signals passed by managers. In other words, the accounting information is disclosed by the information provider and received by the information user, and then reacted to the capital market. Not only the accounting information itself has certain quality characteristics, but also depends on the information user’s subjective Evaluation. Therefore, disclosure of accounting information with quality characteristics only in a credible way to information users will help to effectively allocate capital market resources.