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本文试图在物理主义的框架中复兴和发展平行主义。我尝试论证,平行主义是非还原物理主义者解决排斥问题的一个最好进路。此外,我还表明,还原物理主义的一种最可行的版本—这种理论把心理属性等同于高阶物理属性而非基础物理属性—也会面临排斥问题的挑战,而还原物理主义也最好诉诸于平行主义来回应这一挑战。这就是说,还原主义与非还原主义在关于排斥问题上处于相同的境遇。那么,排斥问题不应再被视为支持还原物理主义的一个有力的理由。
This article attempts to revive and develop parallelism in the framework of physicalism. I have tried to argue that parallelism is one of the best ways non-reductive physicalists can solve the problem of exclusion. In addition, I also show that one of the most viable versions of reductive physicalism - which equates psychological attributes with higher-order rather than fundamental-physical ones - faces the challenge of rejection, and restores physicalism as well Appeal to parallelism in response to this challenge. This means that reductivism and non-reductivism are in the same situation about exclusion. Then, the problem of exclusion should no longer be seen as a powerful reason to support the restoration of physicalism.