一、经理层股票期权激励的理论基础20世纪30年代,美国学者柏利和明斯在其代表作《现代公司与私有财产》中,从经济和法律两方面深刻地揭示了现代股份公司中的权力构造特征,并通过200家公司进行实证研究,对“所有权与控制权相分离”导致的后果忧心忡忡,主张对迅速膨胀的控制权进行修正。①从遍及全球的“公司治理运动”来看,如何构建激励与约束相结合的制衡机制成为 I. The Theoretical Basis of Executive Stock Option Incentives In the 1930s, the American scholar Bai Li and Minshu profoundly revealed the power structure in the modern joint-stock companies in their representative works, “Modern Company and Private Property” from the aspects of economy and law Characteristics, and conducted empirical research with 200 companies, worried about the consequences caused by the “separation of ownership and control”, and advocated amending the right to control the rapid expansion. From the perspective of the “corporate governance movement” throughout the world, how to construct a check and balance mechanism combining incentives and restraints becomes